Prior to privatiza tion, electricity in th e United Kingdom was generated und er monopoly by the Central Electricity Genera ting Board (CEGB). The CEGB was a vertically integrated, government-owned u tility encompassing genera tion and transmission. The di stribution of electrici ty, on the other hand, w as assured th rough 12 so-calle d "Regional Area Boards." The pre-privatization str ucture of th e CEGB is sh ow n in Figure I , where the CEGB 's central ro le in generation and transmission is clearly visible, as is th at of th e non-overlapping, and thus non-competing, re gional are a boards in the case of d istribution.
Elec tr ici ty produc tio n by source, for selected years prior to p rivatization, is outlined in Table 1 . As th e information in this table m a kes clear, the British sy stem was h eav ily dependent on thermal generation, which accounted for more than 70% of electr icity production in the years preceding privatization. Over the sa me p eri od , nuclear accounted for about 20% of production, while h ydro sources were of relative ly minor importance. Finall y, the UK system had a tot al installed capacity of 65,800 MW in 1989, the last fu ll yea r prior to privatization. Table 2 reports 1988 d ata on generating p lants compiled b y th e CEGB . As with most elect ricity -gene ra tion systems w ith ready access to both nuclear technology and n atural gas reserves, the construction and fixed op erating costs of nuclear capacity far excee d ed that of gas turbines (here, by a factor of five on a £ per kW basis). N u clear, however, h ad a clear advantage w h en it came to fue l costs: these w ere one-tenth th e lev els of gas turbines, on a £ per M W h b asis. Coal -fir ed plan ts, on th e other hand , p resen ted a m ore m ixed offer ing: w hi le constru ction costs per un it of capacit y were abou t 60% of those associated wi th nuclear, b oth fixed opera tin g and fu el cos ts were hi gher th an nuclear's (uni t fue l cos ts, for e xamp le, were more th an twice as hi gh for co al as for n u clear, but were still abo u t one -fo urth th ose associated w ith gas turbines).
P ri or to priv atization, th e in d ustry p rovided low er prices to lar ge power cons u mers u n d e r the " La rge Ind u s tri a l C us to me r Sche me" (LICS). A t th e sa me tim e, subsid ies w ere als o provid ed to British coa l p roduction in tw o ways. Co al was guaran tee d a m inimum annual supp ly con tract to th e UK's coal-fired p lan ts, a n d prices p aid for British coal were cons iderably above w orld-equivalent lev els.
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Structure of the UK Electricity Bus iness after Privatization
A 1988 gove rn m en t with p aper en titled : "Priva tiz ing Electricity " b egan th e proces s of privatizing the CEGB. The Electricity Bill was pass ed in Jul y 1989, an d th e new priv atized industry was for m ed on April 1, 1990. A maj or policy objectiv e id entified a t the time w as to in tro d uce private owner sh ip and com petitive p ricin g of ge neration into th e British electricity supp ly industr y, w hi le main tai ning th e operationa l efficiency of a large in tegrated trans rillssion an d di st ribution sys tem wi th cen tral ized d ispatching.
Prop one n ts of the chan ge in ownership str u ctu re cit ed a number of ben efits of p rivatiza tion an d th e ass ocia te d introduction of a com pe titive elec tricity su p p ly market. They argued th at th e result ing ch an ge in structure would :
• provid e a source of funds to reduce go vernm ent d ebt through th e sale of assets; • enc ou rage " p op u la r capitali sm," whereby shares would be offere d to the gene ral public ("share sh ops"); • imp ro ve th e operational efficien cy of the electricity industry; • yield a m ore competitive pow er sup p ly, and he nc e re d uce p rice s to end users through innova tion and greater discipline; • assist in th e d evelopment of an exportable n ati on al industry; • increase opp or tu n ities for em p loyees of priva tize d companies of secur ing m ore di ver sified, fulfilling an d rewarding job s; a n d finall y, • improve the quali ty of cu stomer serv ice.
As the governm en t proceeded wi th th e priva tization, the UK electricity indust ry w as tran sformed, an d its n ew stru ctu re is presented in Fig ure 2 . N a tio n al Power and PowerGen w ere sold in 1991 by share offerings to th e public and to in stitutional an foreig n marke ts. Po ten tial in vestors w ere all ow ed to app ly on ly for a combined minimum purchase of 186 sh ares of N ational Power and 114 shares of Po w erG en. Ini tiall y, 17.1% of th e two companies w as offered to th e ge neral p ublic a nd an additional 12.6% was ear m arke d for th e 54 public, if d emand warran ted . In th e end, all of these sh a res were in d eed p urchased by th e public; th e government re ta ine d a 40% equ ity positio n in th e tw o compan ies, w h ile th e remaining shares were p icked up by ins titu tional and for eign investors.
The governmen t also sold Sou th of Scotland Electr icity an d N or th of Scotland H ydro Elec tric (see Figure 1 ; these comp anies are n ow known as "Scottish Power" and "Scottish H ydro Electric," respectively) an d all 12 regiona l area bo ards (no w calle d "regional elec tricit y co m pa n ie s"-RECs), but retained 100 % of N u clear Electric . As Table 3 sh ows, total proceeds to th e governmen t of the se asset sales reach ed £10.2 billion (ap p r oxim atel y CD N $21.9 billion at 1994 p rices).
Power Generation Structure
Since p rivatization, N uclear Electr ic (and other n on-fossil gen eration ) is subsid ized through a fossil fu el levy on all sa les of electricity. The lev y was initiall y se t a t 10.6%, raised to 11% an d th en reduced to 10% b y April 1993. Current plans call for this levy to be phased out by April 1, 1998.
As Table 4 m ak es clear, p rior to privatization, Na tional Po w er and PowerGen h ad 48% an d 30% of th e market, respecti v ely. N u clear Electric h ad 16.5%. By March 1995, new indep endent gen erators had secured a 7.4% market share, Natio na l Power and Po werG en's market sh ares had fallen to 33.9% and 25.9%, respectively (a 23% drop), w hi le N u clea r Electric's sh are h ad increased to 22.3% (a 35% increa se). (Note that Scottish Po w er an d Scottish Hydro Electric are included under "Interconnectors.") Ev en in th e post-privatization world, the ac tivities of genera tors are cons traine d by th eir relationship w ith th e Electricity Pool of England and Wales (th e "Power Pool"), w h ose rol e is su m m arized in Figure 3 . All ge nerators of over 50 MW must be licen sed an d se ll th eir p ow er into the Power Pool. Generators of less th an 50 MW, on th e other hand, can choose not to be licen sed , and do not h ave to sell their power to th e Power P oo l. Irrespective of th eir size, generators signing contract s directly w ith custome rs must estab lish a supp ly arm, and that arm must obtain a so-called "second -tier license" an d join th e Pow er Poo l -Natio nal Power, PowerG en and N uclear Electric have done p recise ly thi s. Finally, in addition to generators servin g a supply func tion, there are also independent s u p p ly companies, w hich bu y power from genera tors and resell it to users.
Th e Power Pool system is based on a m erit order dispatch principle. Every morning, "m ajor generators " (those of over 100 MW) gi ve N ational Grid Company (NGC) an offer price for th eir power for the next day (th e price at which they are prepared to operate each unit for each half h our of the next day). Based on th is, th e NGC p repares a "sched ule" one day in advance specifying th e order in w hi ch th e stations w ill be dispatched the n ext d ay, with p lants d ispatched in order of increasing cost , and how much po w er eac h must sup ply .
Curren tly, th ere is no central planning w ith re spect to generating capacity d evel op m en t. Development is strictly a com mercial d ecision on th e part of th e d eveloper . Within th at context, National Grid Company can in flu en ce zonal charges and connection costs, w h ile government co nsen t is re quir ed to constr u ct a power station . Indeed, as we w ill see lat er, some activities of th e industry are tig h tly regulated.
Th e firs t in dependent power p lant (IPP) to become operational after priva tization was Lakeland Power (229 MW), comple ted in October 1991. By February 1994, there was a total of 3,200 MW of IPP generators in operation. At peak level of development activity, it was forecast th at plant m argin (excess ca pacity over demand) would reach 50%. The current outlook for prices, however, is such that many of th e plants originally p lanned w ill not p roceed. Closure of old coa l fired s ta tions may also reduce plant margin to a more appropri- The com petitive market is bein g in troduced in three p hases. Starting in April 1990, the competitive market was set at sales in excess of 1 MW. Any consumer of more th an 1 MW of p ow er cou ld p urchase power di rectl y from any licensed su p p li er . In April 1994, th e franchise limit was reduced from 1 MW to 100 kW , brin gin g some 45,000 n ew customers into the competitive market. The franchise limit is scheduled to be elim in a ted on April I, 1998 giv ing and es timated 22 mi llion new cus tomers acces s to the competitive market.
Th ere is a grea t deal of specula tion as to 56
how a totally open direct p urchase structure w ill affect th e supp ly m arkets . One view is th a t it w ill h a ve a d ramatic effec t on these markets, since th ere w ill then b e a w ho le ra nge of com peting sup p liers (12 REC s, ge nerating companies an d independent su p p liers. ) Th e secon d -tier market cou ld b ecome over-pop ulat ed with suppliers, allowing on ly n a rrow m argins to be achi eved. If that were to be th e case, th en cus tomers in th e 100 kW to 1 MW range would be able to p u t pressure on suppliers b y n egotiatin g lo w er prices. In thi s context, the re ta il elec tricity market cou ld b ecome a commodity market ju st as it n ow is in th e greater-than-1-MW m ark et. This w ou ld en sure th e existen ce of a price-transparent market, suc h as a screen based tr ading market (i.e ., natural gas in the US) . Another view is th at th e effect will not b e drama tic. Indeed, by lat e 1994, only 10,000 of the 45,000 cus tomers betw een 100 kW to 1 MW h ad sough t competitive su p p ly. The remaind er , p erhaps, find th e process too comple x. The 12 RECs h ave also appro ache d th eir customer s and offered th em incentives to stay in re turn for tying th em into tw o-yea r contract s. In th is case, parallels w ith Canada's experience w ith th e d eregulation of natural gas su p p ly wo u ld be ev ide n t.
As Figure 4 suggests, ge nera tors com pe te for con trac ts to su p p ly the 12 RECs, w hich are res p ons ib le for elec tric p ow er d istribution in se parate geograp h ica l areas (the "w h olesale market") . Ge nera tors can also enter into "Contracts for Differ ences," which a re h ed gi n g fin an cial in struments that can be n egotiated with both the REC s and the se con d -tier su ppliers (the independent su p p ly companies).
Fina lly, it is important to note that th e UK govern men t has assisted the renewable energy in d ustry through the es tab lishmen t of "nonfoss il fue l ob liga tions," which re qu ire RECs to purchase a spe cified quantity of power genera ted from non-fossil fuel s ou rces. Thes e renew ab le energy se t asides ag gregated to 102 MW in 1990 and to 450 MW in 1991. The 1994 an n ual re port of th e U K Office of Electricity Regu lation (O FFER 1995) sugges ted that an ad d itional tr anc he of ap p roxim ate ly 400 MW of non -fossil fue l ob liga tions was under active consi deration . As of th e time of w riting, however, n o suc h initiative had been undertaken on this fro n t.
Transmission and Distribution Structur e
Nationa l Gr id Com pany (N GC) w as formed in 1990 b y th e di saggregation of th e CEGB. It h an d les th e transmission of p ow er, organizes a n efficie n t contract sys te m betwe en area bo a rds and ge nera tors an d ens ures a minimum cos t of di spatching power. Transmission, how ever, d oes not actu ally function as a free market syste m: NGC owns th e transmission sys tem, th e 12 RECs ow n the reg iona l di stribution systems, and th e 12 RECs also collect ive ly own NGe. NGC's main business is th e operation, m aintenance a nd d evel opment of th e tran smission sys tern , it coor d in ates th e op er ation of the major p ow er sta tions (of over 100 MW in capacity ) to m eet d emand (the socalled "Scheduling an d Disp atch" syste m). Th e s ubsid iaries of NG C (Natio nal Grid Settlements Ad m in is tra tor and th e Power Pool) ar range for ge nerato rs to be pa id for th e p ower th ey p roduce and for th e su ppliers (RECs) to p ay for th e power they use.
Transm iss ion ra tes are subject to regu la ted price con trols. To finan ce its b usin ess, NG C charges grid user s for the se rvices it provides . Specifically, the follo wing charges are levied:
• en try and exit charges; • system service charges; and • infrastructure charge s.
The di stribution is done by the 12 RECs, w hich operate as monopolies. Distri bution cha rg es ar e subject to a price control formula . Th e incre ase in th e ave rag e distribution charge per unit is res tric ted to RPI (inflation), p lu s or minus a fixed p ercentage amount (calculated for each REC) . The cost in cu rr ed b y the REC for s u p p lyi n g elec tricity to its cus tomers, w hic h include its p ow er p urchase cos ts, th e fossil fu el levy, an d transmission and distribution charge s are passed on to th e customer .
The Regulator

Th e regu la tory bod y is call ed th e O ffice of Electricity Regulation (OFFER) an d is h eaded b y a Di rector General, currently Professor
Step he n Littlechi ld. The duties of OFFER are to encourage competition in ge ne ra tion an d suppl y, an d to p rotect consumers wi th respect to prices and standards of service. Some au thority to intervene on electr icity market s h as thus been ves te d in th e regulator. It is important to n ot e th at th e re levant legislation d oes n ot require public h ea rings to precede any su ch interv ention, n or does it provide for a m ech ani sm through which d ecisions of the regula tor could be appeal ed. All in all, OFFER remains a re latively small oper ation, funded through the flO million (approximately CON $21.6 million) licensin g fees it collects annually. In 1994, it employed 200 people to oversee the electricity market in a country of more 50 million people. As a point of comparison, the On tario Energy Board employed 50 people and had an operating budget of CON 55.5 million in 1994.
Effect Of Privatization on Power Prices
As noted earlier, in the w holesale b u lk electricity market (the Power Pool), a sp o t price is determined every half hour through competitive bidding by ge nera tors. Th e se llers are th e gen era tors, and the buyers are distribu tion companies (RECs), other licensed suppliers and large consumers b uying d irectl y from gen era tors . The Power Pool pays ge nerators th e Pool Purchase Price (PPP), which is the system marginal price (SMP) p lus a capacity payment. The b uyers pay the Pool Selling Price (PSP), which is the Pool Purchase Price plus an " u p lift" to cover additional system costs.
Pool prices in the firs t year of operation followed movements in demand quite closely, 58 and were about 25% low er than had been predicted at the s tar t of the privatization process. However, in creases in Pool prices were substantial in March of 1992 and 1993 as well as between September and December of 1994. As Table 5 indicates, th e average Pool Selling Price w as abou t fl8.34/MWh (3.67 CON cen ts /kWh) in 1990/91. In the second year after privatization (late 1991), this price increased by 22% to £22.43/MWh (4.48 CON cents / kW h) . More price spikes h a v e also been observed since privatization. For instance, the peak half hour price on December 11, 1991 reached £370/MWh, w hen NGC was at peak demand. On a similar note, an extremely high capacity price was reached in December 1994, due to ou tages of several p lan ts resulting in a narrower gap between demand and availa ble supply. On the other hand, th ere have been a few occasions w here sufficient generation h as been bi d in at zero resu lting in a ze ro Pool price. The generators scheduled to run did so for no payment, perhaps, to avoid fuel take-orpay penalties. On a similar n ot e, in the firs t three months of 1992, Pool prices fell 16% over 1991, due in part to a better-than-average performance rea lized by N uclear Electric.
For many d irect purchase consumers, prices ar e determined by contracts, and are not The n et effe ct for m ost large cu stomers is that, since privatization, prices paid are actually low er af ter inflation. Howeve r, la rge consu m ers di d in cur large Pool p rice in crea ses in April of 1993 an d in Oct ober-D ecember of 1994. The reaction to the price increase of Ap ril 1993 led a Government Select Committee to recommen d , in Feb ruary 1994, th at ste ps b e taken to re d uce th e influence of th e tw o major generators, National Power an d Pow erG en. In the aftermath of th e sharp p rice inc reases of April 1993, OFFER conclu ded th at prices in th e Pool were artificia lly lo w ered, but that b y April 1993, prices were in creased above the avoided cos ts of the tw o ge nerato rs . W ithin tha t context, OFFER's grea tes t con cern w as that the two generators h ad too great an influen ce over Pool prices. In its Feb ruary 1994 repor t entitled: "De cis ion on a M onopoly an d Mergers Commission Reference," OFFER ru led that Natio na l Power and PowerGen h ad to cap their prices over th e next two years (1994 and 1995) at the lev els prevailing in October 1993. This was d esigned to h ave the effect of restricting Pool prices to a 7% decrease over 1994 and 1995 com pare d to the levels prevaili n g a t the be ginning of 1994. As a further way of curbing the infl uen ce of th e two generators, th e ru ling b y OFFER also specified th at in depen den t g enera ti on would b e increased b y th e sa le of 6,000 MW of p lan t cap a cit y b y National Power an d Pow erG en. (Note, however, that thi s sa le had not occurred at th e time of writing.)
Despite th e increa se in Pool p ric es in 1993 and 1994, d omestic (residential) ele ctricity prices have not, over th e five years since privatizati on ' inc reased fas ter th an th e rate of inflation, as in dica ted in Tab le 6. This is due mainly to the price controls imposed b y OFFER, which h ad their effect spread over 1994 and 1995 average p ric es. Other fac tors h av e als o contributed to limited cos t in crea ses. In particul ar, the RECs h av e reduced the cost of their di stribution se rv ices subs ta n tia lly through th e elimination of th ousan d s of jobs, thus increasin g operational efficiency.
Ana lysis of Restructuring: Upside and Downside
The Upside
The positive reasons for privatization, which appear to h ave b een achieved to a d egree, are:
• reduction of government borrowing and deficits through asset sales; • " p op u lar capitalism" -w ide share ow ner- 1989/ 1990 1990/1 991 1991 /1992 1992/1993 1993/ 1994 1994/1995 ship; • im p roved ope ra ting efficiency; • re d uced labo ur cos ts; • a cha nge in business cu lture from engin eering to m arketing an d fin ance w h ich implies long-term ben efits through grea ter en trep ren eurial innovation; • im proved cus tom er service.
Fuel cost savings, through th e rem oval of the obliga tion to buy from Bri tish Co al, w ere also achieved. British Co al intends to ch a rge a world-equivalen t price for coal b y th e en d of 1995. In th e mean tim e, re la tive prices have favoured natural gas, an d this fu el has indeed replaced coa l in man y thermal ge neration operations.
Prices for m any la rge consumers (which are able to n eg otia te direct purchase contracts w ith ge n era tors) h av e actu ally d eclined after in flation. Other s, h ow ever, h ave experien ced price in creases due in part to th e abolition of th e electricity price subs id ies that existed prior to p rivatization. To counter the upward pressu re on prices ca use d b y th e increa se in retu rns requ ire d b y invest or-owned companies, other p olicy changes were introduced: • relaxing res trictions on th e use of natural ga s for ge nerators; • increasing com petition in natural gas sup p ly; • red u cing the capacity reserve m ar gin; and • en couraging industrial u sers to ge nerate th eir own pow er (and sell any surp lus). Sin ce p rivatization, N u clea r Electric h as m ade impressive improvements in operating efficie n cy: prod uctivity ha s increased from 2.9 to 5.76 GW h per em p loy ee, as Table 7 indicat es. On a sim ilar note, Na tion al Power imp ro v ed prod u ctiv ity by reducing its s taffing from 17,500 to 7,000 in three ye a rs , while Pow erGen has gon e from a w orkforce of 9,000 to one of 4,500.
As n oted earlie r, the UK gov ernmen t to date h as earned £10.2 billion (approximate ly 60 CON $21.9 bill ion at 1994 prices ) from th e proceeds of priva tization. Still to come are proceeds from its 40% in ter es t in N a tional Pow er an d Pow erG en and from its 100% owners hip of N u clea r Elec tri c, s ubject to b uyers b ein g found for these asse ts.
It can also be argued that privatization h as re su lted in a m ore en tre p reneurial electricity in d us try in th e U K. The ge neration su p p ly b usinesses h ave d evel op ed a more entrepren eurial culture th an was evi dent prior to 1990, and even the transmission an d di stribution b usinesses, w h ich are still monopolies, a re n ow involve d in n u m er ou s com pe titive ventu res.
Th e Down side
One of the major di sadvantages of th e system is th at th e m ark et is extr emel y com p lex. Due to the phasedin n ature of th e privatization p rocess and to th e ensuing restructuring of the industry, th e market w ill continue to ev olve as user s ge t familiar with it.
In the p riva tization p ro cess, th e g overnm ent pursued a number of objecti ves sim u ltan eously, an d some of th ese acte d to slow th e arriva l of competi tion. For example, th ere in itiall y was to b e su pp or t for th e British coal indus tr y b y seeking to ensure that it wou ld retain 30% of th e fuel m ark et for th erm al electric it y ge nera tion . This objective w as eff ectiv ely ab andoned as th e re structuring proceed ed, su ch that coal' s share is now es tim a ted to b e abou t 20%, and w ill decline fu rther as old p la n ts are re tired an d re p laced b y gas-fired combined cycle plants. Th e g overnmen t's inten tion to sup p or t th e franchise market until 1998 for th e RECs has also slowed down comp etition.
Another sh ortcoming of th e restructuring is th at th er e w ere only two major priva te gene rating companies es tablishe d as opposed to the 5-10 w h ich sho u ld have been es tab lishe d to elim ina te th e possibility of prices being contro lled by anyone ge nerator . In fact, th e m ain criticism to date of th e p riv atization exercise has been th e fact th at th e two large generators exer t too m uch infl ue nce on electr icity prices. The UK system of regula tion also has its weaknesses. Th e regulator is a single person, n ot a tribunal, and the process is not open to the scrutiny of p ublic hearin gs. For exa mp le, the regulator's d ecision to limit 1994 and 1995 prices to th e October 1993 level w as seen by many as an ex tremely d et ri m ental m ove for power d evel op ers wi th p ro jects under developmen t. A number of potential new d evelopm ents have been cancelled as a result of the Power Pool price interventi on .
Th e regula tor can also alter th e licen sin g cond itions of th e regulated or ganizations (the generating companies and th e RECs) an d th ere is no jud icial p rocess for appealing th ese d ecisions. Despite th is inherent weakness, th e UK regulatory process is seen to be less drawn ou t and legalistic than th e US and Canadian systems.
The new private compan ies are, of course, exp ected to earn higher market rates of return than th e CEGB. The required real ra te of re turn would be expected to be a risk free rate (say 3-4%), plus a risk premium (say 7-8%) for a riskad juste d real ra te of about 10 to 12%. Th at hi gher return would be expected to have two impacts on prices. First, di scounting at a high rate w ould favo ur in vestments w ith lo w er capital, but hi gher operating cost s. Secon d , hi gher reve n ue is required to achieve p ro fit targe ts.
Pri vatization h as also h ad negative employment effects. In particular, th e d eclining m arket share of coal in th ermal electricity gener ation is fore cast to eliminat e 30,000 "pit" jobs. Productivity improvements at National Po w er and Po w erGen have elim inate d 10,500 and 4,500 jobs, res pectively, in a three-year period. Total em ploymen t of N u clear Ele ctric has fallen from 14,164 in 1989 to 9,454 in 1994, and employment b y th e RECs has also d ecre ased subs tan tially .
Lessons Learned
While it w ou ld be inappro pria te to apply th e British approach directly to Ca nadian utility restructuring, many valua ble lessons can be learned from reviewing th e UK experience .
• Due to th e numerous othe r issu es in volved , th e effec ts of privatization are impossible to iso la te from th e other agendas pursued by the Governmen t.
• The UK example proves that privatization of a large electricity utility can be achieved w ith ou t significan t power price in creases.
• U tili ty pri vatization can be a n effectiv e m eans to promote the participation of the public in utility stock purchases.
• Both p ublic sh are offerings under priva tization were over-subscribed (National Power, Po werGen, and the RECs). Any public float of Canad ian utilities sh ou ld en sure a su bs tan tial allocation of sh ares for purchase b y Canadians.
• Th e UK system is extr em ely complex, p artly b ecau se of the numerous objectives th e government endeavoured to achieve (e.g ., protection of Briti sh Coal, su p p ort for Nuclear Electric , su p p or t for franchise m arket and su p p or t for renewable energy). Attempts should be made to focus on the central g oals of ele ctr icity industry re structuring (e.g., attracting p rivate in ve stment, improving op erational efficiency, increasing productivity through competition, etc.) and reducing electricity rat es.
• Competitive bidding has been partly responsible for impressive improvements in productivity. N a tion al Power, PowerGen, N uclear Electric and the REC s have all substantially reduced their labour costs.
• The use of a re gulator to set prices can ensure th at power prices do not substantially increase due to a privatization-related restr uctu rin g.
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• A regulatory process that gives an individual the right to set some prices, but does not provide for an ap peal m echanism of th ese decisions can result in investors seeking an additional risk premium, thus further res tri cting new generators from en tering th e sy stem.
• When establishing new generation compani es to se ll into a com pe titive m arket, a sufficient number of new gen era tors must be licensed to prevent price control by any sin gle company, or small group of companies.
